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Abstract 
 
This paper concerns the difficult task of judging judges. The first part deals with South 
African law by discussing the role of the Judicial Services Commission in disciplining judges. 
This part also critically evaluates the ongoing Tribunals. The second part deals with New 
Zealand law by discussing the role of the Commissioner and the Attorney-General regarding 
the Panel. This part also analyses the investigative role of the Panel. The third part draws 
comparative lessons. The first concerns diversity in Tribunal and Panel membership. The 
second concerns separating conduct from law and policy. Is it non-compliance with the 
framework or the framework itself? 
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper concerns the difficult task of judging judges. The central question in conduct 
inquiries is whether it is possible to separate conduct issues from law and policy issues.1 The 
paper compares South Africa’s Judicial Conduct Tribunal (Tribunal) with New Zealand’s 
Judicial Conduct Panel (Panel). While South Africa with its supreme Constitution has three 
ongoing Tribunals in respect of several judges, New Zealand with its parliamentary 
supremacy has no current Panels. 
 
The first part deals with South African law. This part sets out its fundamental structure and 
discusses the role of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) regarding the Tribunal. The 
paper then critically evaluates the ongoing Tribunals.  
 
The second part deals with New Zealand law. This part sets out its fundamental structure and 
discusses the role of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (Commissioner) and the Attorney-
General regarding the Panel. The paper then discusses the investigative role of the Panel. 
 
The third part draws lessons from the preceding parts. The first concerns diversity in Tribunal 
and Panel membership; South Africa has gender diversity and New Zealand has lay diversity. 
The second concerns fencing off conduct issues from law and policy issues. The paper 
concludes that judicial misconduct is more about non-compliance with the applicable 
framework than the framework itself.  
 
A. South Africa 
 
1. Fundamental Structure 
 
South Africa has a codified Constitution that is the supreme law.2 The Constitution 
guarantees judicial independence. It provides for judicial authority in that judges are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law;3 it also provides that 
Constitutional Court justices are appointed for non-renewal terms of office.4 But the 
Constitution also ensures accountability; it provides for the removal of judges from office on 
                                                          
1 Mai Chen Public Law Toolbox: Solving Problems with Government (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2012) at 652. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 2. 
3 Constitution, s 165(2). 
4 Constitution, s 176(1). 
4 
Research Paper (LAWS 549) – Judging Judges: Comparing Tribunals with Panels 
 
 
 
grounds of incapacity, gross incompetence, or gross misconduct;5 removal can only take 
place by vote of at least two-thirds of the National Assembly.6  
 
The Constitution is silent on judicial misconduct that falls short of the ultimate sanction of 
removal.7 Professor Corder provides an explanation for this silence. The traditional common 
law approach to judicial discipline was that of collegiality and peer pressure amongst the 
judges. But the onset of the Constitution and the appointment of judges from diverse 
constituencies has arguably “weakened” the sense of shared propriety amongst judges.8 One 
of the JSC’s functions is to discipline judges and it is arguable that the body has stepped into 
the shoes of judicial peer pressure. The JSC has the powers and functions assigned to it by the 
Constitution and national legislation.9 The Judicial Service Commission Act (JSC Act) is 
such national legislation.10 
 
Disciplining judges implicates the doctrine of separation of powers. This doctrine concerns 
the distribution of power between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.11 
Parliament makes laws, the executive administers them, and the courts interpret and apply 
them.12 The doctrine is not rigidly defined, nor is it absolute.13 Separation of powers does not 
appear by name in the Constitution; it is nonetheless the “dominant organising principle of 
state power”.14  
 
2. Judicial Service Commission 
 
The JSC is an organ of State bound by public administration principles.15 One of its 
constitutional functions is the making of findings in respect of the grounds for removal of 
judges.16   
                                                          
5 Constitution, s 177(1)(a). 
6 Constitution, s 177(1)(b). 
7 Hugh Corder “Judicial Accountability” in Olivier and Hoexter The Judiciary in South Africa (Juta, Cape 
Town, 2014) at 213. 
8 Corder, n 7, at 213. 
9 Constitution, s 178(4). 
10 Judicial Services Commission Act, 1994 (Act No. 9 of 1994). 
11 Dikgang Moseneke, Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa “Separation of Powers: Have the Courts Crossed 
the Line?” (Inaugural Annual Law Dean‘s Distinguished Lecture, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, 
17 July 2015) at 5. 
12 Moseneke, n 11, at 6. 
13 Moseneke, n 11, at 6. 
14 Moseneke, n 11, at 8. 
15 Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council (Centre for Constitutional Rights as amicus curiae) 
(818/11) [2012] ZASCA 115 (14 September 2012) para 43. 
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3. Judicial Conduct Tribunal 
 
(a) The 2008 amendment 
 
The JSC’s powers and functions are dealt with in the amended JSC Act, which commenced in 
June 2010. The long title of the Act describes its objective and can be used in determining the 
constitutional validity of the Act.17 The long title reads: 
 
To regulate matters incidental to the establishment of the Judicial Service 
Commission by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; to 
establish the Judicial Conduct Committee to receive and deal with complaints 
about judges; to provide for a Code of Judicial Conduct which serves as the 
prevailing standard of judicial conduct which judges must adhere to; to 
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a register of judges' 
registrable interests; to provide for procedures for dealing with complaints 
about judges; to provide for the establishment of Judicial Conduct Tribunals 
to inquire into and report on allegations of incapacity, gross incompetence or 
gross misconduct against judges; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith. 
 
Section 8 establishes the Judicial Conduct Committee (JCC) and its composition. Section 12 
provides for a Code of Conduct. This Code has now been published.18 The Code deals with 
judicial independence and provides that judges must not ask for or accept a special favour or 
dispensation from the executive.19 Judges must act honourably and in a manner befitting a 
judge.20 Judges are required to be diligent in handing down judgments promptly and without 
undue delay.21 Judges must exercise restraint and debates amongst judges are confidential.22 
The Code deals with association and states that judges must not belong to any political 
party.23 Returning to the amended JSC Act, the JCC may recommend the appointment of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 Constitution, s 177(1)(a). 
17 Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety and Security and Others (CCT 77/08) [2009] 
ZACC 11 (7 May 2009) para 43. 
18 “Code of Judicial Conduct” (18 October 2012) 865 Government Gazette 35802. 
19 Code, art 4. 
20 Code, art 5. 
21 Code, art 10. 
22 Code, art 11. 
23 Code, art 12. 
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Tribunal in respect of “impeachable complaints”;24 the JSC may request the Chief Justice to 
appoint a Tribunal;25 and the JSC must consider the Tribunal’s report.26  
 
Chapter 3 deals with Tribunals. The Chief Justice must appoint a Tribunal whenever 
requested to do so.27 Section 22 deals with the composition of the Tribunal; there must be 
two judges, one of whom is designated Tribunal President, and one other person from a list 
maintained by the Executive Secretary; this third person must be a non-judicial member but 
not a layperson.28 Section 22(2) requires that at least one member must be a woman. Section 
24(1) authorises the Tribunal President to appoint a member of the prosecuting authority29 to 
collect and adduce evidence on behalf of the Tribunal.  
 
The amended JSC Act obliges the Chief Justice to make rules regulating the Tribunal’s 
procedures.30 The Rules have now been published.31 At the hearing, the evidence leader may 
address the Tribunal, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and address the Tribunal at the 
close of proceedings.32 The proceedings of the Tribunal are to be recorded.33  
 
The objects of the Tribunal are to inquire into allegations of incapacity, gross incompetence, 
or gross misconduct.34 The Tribunal does so by collecting evidence, conducting a hearing, 
making findings of fact, and making determinations on the merits.35 The Tribunal proceeds in 
an inquisitorial manner and there is no onus on any person to prove or dispute any fact.36  
 
The Tribunal must submit a report to the JSC. The report must contain the findings and the 
reasons for them, a copy of the hearing, and all other relevant documentation.37  
 
 
                                                          
24 Amended JSC Act, s 16. 
25 Amended JSC Act, s 19. 
26 Amended JSC Act, s 20. 
27 Amended JSC Act, s 21(1). 
28 Amended JSC Act, s 22(1). 
29 National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (Act No. 32 of 1998).  
30 Amended JSC Act, s 25. 
31 “Rules to Regulate Procedures before Judicial Conduct Tribunals” (18 October 2012) 864 Government 
Gazette 35802. 
32 Tribunal Rules 2012, r 7.  
33 Tribunal Rules 2012, r 9. 
34 Amended JSC Act, s 26. 
35 Amended JSC Act, s 26(1)(a). 
36 Amended JSC Act, s 26(2). 
37 Amended JSC Act, s 33(1). 
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(b) The Hlophe JP matter 
 
(i) Litigation history 
In March 2008 the Constitutional Court heard argument in four matters relating to the 
prosecution of the current President Jacob Zuma as well as Thint (Pty) Ltd on corruption 
charges. Before reserved judgment was handed down, Hlophe JP approached two justices 
(Nkabinde J and Jafta AJ) separately in chambers. It was alleged that Hlophe JP had 
improperly attempted to influence the justices. There are conflicting versions as to exactly 
what transpired in chambers. On 30 May 2008 the Constitutional Court justices lodged a 
complaint with the JSC. There have been several court cases; the matter has gone through the 
entire superior court structure once and is likely to do so again.38 
 
(ii) The Labuschagne Tribunal  
 
In February 2013 the JSC released a media briefing. The Chief Justice named retired judge 
Labuschagne as Tribunal President. The other members are a judge and practising attorney.39 
The Tribunal proceedings commenced but not for long. Preliminary objections were raised 
but were dismissed resulting in an application for review of the Tribunal’s decision. 
 
In Nkabinde and Another v JSC and Others,40 the applicants sought to review the JSC’s 
decisions of April and October 2012 to request the appointment of a Tribunal; the review was 
based on grounds of retrospectivity and non-compliance with formalities. The applicants also 
challenged the constitutionality of section 24(1) of the amended JSC Act.41 The applicants 
claimed that the JSC had changed the “rules of engagement” and incorrectly applied the 
amended JSC Act retrospectively.42 While the trigger event occurred in 2008, the amended 
JSC Act only commenced in 2010. 
 
 
                                                          
38 See Langa v Hlophe (697/08) [2009] ZASCA 36 (31 March 2009); Hlophe v Judicial Service Commission 
and Others (19006/09) [2009] ZAGPJHC 19 (1 June 2009); Freedom Under Law v Acting Chairperson: 
Judicial Service Commission and Others (52/2011) [2011] ZASCA 59 (31 March 2011); Acting Chairperson: 
Judicial Service Commission and Others v Premier of the Western Cape Province (537/10) [2011] ZASCA 53 
(31 March 2011); Hlophe v Premier of the Western Cape Province, Hlophe v Freedom Under Law and Other 
(CCT 41/11, CCT 46/11) [2012] ZACC 4 (30 March 2012). 
39 JSC “Media Briefing” (press statement, Johannesburg, South Africa, 22 February 2013). 
40 Nkabinde and Another v Judicial Service Commission President of the Judicial Conduct Tribunal and Others 
(13/39093) [2014] ZAGPJHC 217 (26 September 2014).  
41 At para 7. 
42 At para 42. 
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Regarding retrospectivity, the court referred to another judgment in the Poswa J matter. The 
court held that the amended JSC Act distinguished lodgement of a complaint from the 
investigation of an allegation.43 The legislature would have been aware of the complaint in 
the Hlophe matter when it was enacting the amendment Act.44 The amended JSC Act 
contemplates investigation of allegations of gross misconduct but not for lesser complaints; a 
prospective interpretation would undermine its stated purpose.45 The new procedures did not 
abolish one forum for another but rather the “procedures, structures and mechanisms” created 
by the amendment constitute a more effective way of carrying out the Tribunal’s 
investigative function.46 No vested rights had been violated.47 
 
The court then dealt with the issue of non-compliance with formalities for the lodging of a 
complaint. The requirement of an affidavit was directory in respect of impeachable conduct.48 
Any defect had been cured by the evidence on record.49 
 
The court then considered the constitutional challenge, which was based on separation of 
powers and judicial independence. The court noted that while the applicants objected to a 
non-judicial person leading evidence, they were apparently unconcerned with the third non-
judicial member of the Tribunal. This was inconsistent.50 There were also considerations of 
cost and convenience in using prosecutors instead of legal practitioners.51 Section 24(1) is not 
peremptory.52 The prosecutor’s role was “neither necessary, nor defined, nor adversarial, in 
the usual sense”.53 The application was dismissed. 
 
A recent publication entitled The Judiciary in South Africa has criticised the JSC’s handling 
of the matter. Writing before the Nkabinde case had even been heard, the authors correctly 
summed up the “Hlophe saga” as follows:54 
                                                          
43 At para 89.  
44 At para 90. 
45 At para 90. 
46 At para 91. 
47 At para 93. 
48 At para 99. 
49 At para 102. 
50 At para 109. 
51 At para 110. 
52 At para 112. 
53 At para 116. 
54 Olivier and Hoexter, n 7, at 194 – 195 footnotes omitted.  
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The remarkable and long-running Hlophe saga has had many damaging 
effects. It has tarnished the image of South Africa’s judiciary at home and 
abroad, and has sapped public confidence in it. It has exacerbated racial 
tensions in the legal community even though, as Corder has pointed out, most 
of the complainants have been black South Africans. Above all, it has called 
into question the competence and effectiveness of the JSC in the context of 
judicial discipline. The record suggests that the JSC’s handling of the Hlophe 
affair has been characterised far too often by blundering, irresolution and 
irrationality. More disquietening still, certain episodes in the saga suggest ‘a 
fundamental unwillingness to confront seriously and pursue to their logical 
conclusion allegations of great moment which go to … fitness to hold judicial 
office’, at least on the part of some members of the JSC. This has encouraged 
suspicions that a political agenda is being pursued by some commissioners, 
and has added fuel to the campaign for radical change in the composition of 
the body.  
 
Regrettably, the dismissal of the review application in Nkabinde has not brought finality to 
the matter. Recent press clippings reveal that Justices Nkabinde and Jafta have now appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal.55 The JSC filed opposing papers in February 2015.56 The 
matter has yet to be set down for hearing. It is likely to go all the way to the Constitutional 
Court.  
 
(c) The Motata J matter 
 
(i) Litigation history 
 
The judge was arrested in the early hours of 6 January 2007 after having reversed his Jaguar 
into a boundary wall. He was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. The judge appealed his conviction. In Motata v S57 the court held that it was 
“extremely improbable” that a sober High Court judge would use the kind of bad language 
                                                          
55 Franny Rabkin “Top judges seek to appeal” Business Day (online ed., South Africa, 21 January 2015). 
56 Monique van Eeden “SCA asked to dismiss appeal by ConCourt judges” Litigator (online ed., South Africa, 
26 February 2015).  
57 Motata v S (A345/2010) [2010] ZAGPJHC 134 (29 November 2010). 
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that the appellant did on the night in question; the appellant repeatedly used the f-word and 
made racist remarks.58 The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Motata v Minister of Justice and Others59 concerned a complaint lodged with the JSC based 
on the judge’s racist remarks.60 The Code of Judicial Conduct was still to be approved by 
Parliament. The applicant argued that there was no legal basis on which he could be 
charged.61 The court held that if this were correct then no judge could be found guilty until 
the Code had been formally approved.62 The application was dismissed.   
 
(ii) The Jappie Tribunal 
 
According to the JSC’s media briefing in February 2013 the Chief Justice named the then 
Jappie DJP as Tribunal President along with another judge and practising attorney.63 But the 
Tribunal has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Nkabinde case.64 There is no 
end in sight more than eight years after the trigger event.  
 
(d) The Preller, Poswa, Mavundla, and Webster JJ matters 
 
(i) Litigation history 
 
This matter affects four High Court judges and concerns the violation of an ethical duty to 
deliver reserve judgments timeously. In Poswa v President of the RSA and Others65 the facts 
were that the judge had delayed in delivering judgments for periods in excess of 12 months 
after the matter had been heard.66 Various complaints were forwarded to the JSC during 
                                                          
58 At para 9. 
59 Motata v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (66300/11) [2012] ZAGPPHC 196 
(7 September 2012). 
60 At para 3. 
61 At para 11. 
62 At para 15. 
63 JSC Media Briefing, n 39. 
64 Franny Rabkin “Judge Motata proceedings put on hold” Business Day (online ed., South Africa, 22 February 
2014). 
65 Poswa v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (2013/30021) [2014] ZAGPJHC 218 (15 
September 2014). 
66 At para 12. 
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December 2008 and January 2009.67 Incidentally, the applicant was boarded on medical 
grounds and discharged from active service with retrospective effect from 1 August 2011.68 
 
The applicant complained that the JSC had taken too long in prosecuting the complaints 
against him. The court noted that to complain about delay on the part of the JSC when the 
judge had delayed in delivering judgment “smacks of impertinence”.69 The court held that 
there was no authority for the “extraordinary proposition” relied on by the applicant, namely, 
that he could interdict the JSC from executing its statutory duty regarding the complaints 
lodged with it.70 But the “crux of the matter” was whether the JSC was correct in applying 
the new procedural provisions of the amended JSC Act to complaints lodged prior to June 
2010.71 The court’s reasoning has already been dealt with. An additional reason for rejecting 
the argument based on retrospectivity is that section 17 contains beneficial provisions that 
increase the remedial steps that may be taken by the Tribunal.72 Why deny the judge the 
benefit of these provisions? The application was dismissed. 
 
(ii) Nkabinde Tribunal 
 
According to the JSC’s media briefing in February 2013 the Chief Justice named 
Constitutional Court justice Nkabinde as Tribunal President along with another judge and 
practising advocate.73 But the Tribunal has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of the 
Nkabinde case. There is again no end in sight approximately seven years after the trigger 
event.   
4. Tentative Conclusions 
 
This paper argues that the ongoing Tribunals demonstrate that the current problems in the 
judiciary are not the result of the legal framework but rather non-compliance with the 
framework on the part of individual judges. But what is even more revealing is the absence of 
any meaningful protest or even commentary from the legal profession on the misconduct 
described above. This paper submits that at least part of the fault for non-compliance lies with 
                                                          
67 At para 18. 
68 At para 44. 
69 At para 50. 
70 At para 54. 
71 At para 56. 
72 At para 73.2. 
73 JSC Media Brief, n 39. 
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the legal profession and its failure to hold judges to account. As already noted, Professor 
Corder explains that the appointment of judges from diverse constituencies has weakened the 
sense of shared propriety amongst judges; the traditional common law approach of judicial 
peer pressure is no longer effective. It appears that it was left to the JSC to discipline judges 
but it was unrealistic to expect the JSC alone to deal with such a difficult task. Furthermore, 
Olivier and Hoexter have already noted the suspicions of a political agenda on the part of 
some commissioners on the JSC. Rather, the legal profession should have responded to the 
erosion of judicial integrity from the outset. If judges know that their legal kin are keeping a 
weather eye on their conduct then it is more likely that they will refrain from conduct 
unbecoming of their honourable office. This paper will return to this point further below.  
 
The same concerns do not appear to apply in New Zealand. As will be seen immediately 
below, the constitutional arrangements in New Zealand are markedly different from those in 
South Africa. But it is argued that this difference does not explain the fact that there are no 
current Panels in New Zealand. Perhaps there is a stronger sense of shared propriety amongst 
judges and the broader legal profession that ensures greater compliance with the legal 
framework than is the case in South Africa. And this sense of propriety has been developed 
over a long period of time. It must also be said that New Zealand has not had to contend with 
the same transformational upheaval as South Africa.  
 
B. New Zealand 
 
1. Fundamental Structure 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC’s recent book entitled Reform: A Memoir describes New Zealand’s 
“Constitution” as being “unique” and “odd”.74 Palmer also notes that New Zealand does not 
have a “Constitution” in the same sense as America75 or South Africa. In New Zealand, laws 
can be changed by a simple parliamentary majority except for a provision in the Constitution 
Act 1986 and five provisions in the Electoral Act 1993.76 Palmer outlines the constitution as 
follows:77  
 
                                                          
74 Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC Reform: A Memoir (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 337. 
75 At 338. 
76 At 338. 
77 At 339 footnote omitted. 
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In a nutshell here is how the constitution of New Zealand works. The 
Parliament passes laws, levies taxes and controls government expenditure. 
Elections are required to be held every three years and they are held under a 
system of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP). The Cabinet, 
the members of whom must be members of Parliament, governs. Members of 
Cabinet must maintain the confidence of Parliament in order to remain in 
office. The public service operates under the authority of ministers and must 
carry out their decisions. The courts operate independently of both Parliament 
and the executive branch of government, which consists of Cabinet and the 
public service. Parliament creates the law and the courts decide disputes 
according to these statutes, but the role of interpreting the law in any 
particular case falls to the courts, not to Parliament. If the result is not to 
Parliament’s liking, it can amend the law. The judiciary is shielded by law 
from interference by ministers. The judiciary is the main protector of the 
important constitutional norm of the rule of law. Clearly, public power is not 
distributed evenly among these three branches of government. Parliament has 
most power.  
 
The Constitution Act provides for the grounds of removal of a judge. But the Judicial 
Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004 (Panel Act) provides that the 
Attorney-General has “absolute discretion” in determining whether a resolution for removal 
should be put before the House of Representatives.78 This narrows the constitutional 
provision for removal since, prior to the Panel Act, a parliamentarian could introduce a 
measure for removal of a judge.79 Section 23 of the Constitution Act reads as follows:  
 
23 Protection of Judges against removal from office 
A Judge of the High Court shall not be removed from office except by the 
Sovereign or the Governor-General, acting upon an address of the House of 
Representatives, which address may be moved only on the grounds of that 
Judge's misbehaviour or of that Judge's incapacity to discharge the functions 
of that Judge's office. 
 
                                                          
78 Panel Act, s 33(1). 
79 Chen Public Law Toolbox, n 1, at 879. 
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Although section 23 concerns judicial accountability, the section heading refers to 
“[p]rotection of Judges” thereby indicating a different concern.80 The sanction may prove 
difficult to implement; it appears to be directed at the general conduct of judges rather than 
their specific decisions.81 Another difficulty is that “misbehaviour” is a diffuse concept.82 
The interpretation of “misbehaviour” directly affects judicial independence. Narrow 
interpretation would result in a judge being removed only in extreme circumstances. Wide 
interpretation would expose judges to an increased possibility of removal.83  
 
Since 2010 there have been no matters warranting reference to the Panel.84 Some have argued 
that this makes a formal complaint system unnecessary. But the alternative inference is that 
judicial misconduct has been dealt with behind closed doors amongst an inner circle.85  
 
Dr Matthew Palmer QC has described New Zealand’s constitution as comprising various key 
“office-holders” relevant to the interpretation of constitutional instruments.86 Two such 
officeholders are the Commissioner and the Attorney-General.87  
 
 
2. Commissioner 
 
The Commissioner’s functions are to receive complaints and deal with them in the manner 
that the Panel Act requires, to conduct preliminary examinations where appropriate, and to 
recommend the appointment of a Panel where appropriate.88 The Commissioner must act 
independently.89  
 
In conducting a preliminary examination, the Commissioner must form an opinion (a) 
whether the subject-matter of the complaint, if substantiated, warrants consideration of 
                                                          
80 Andrew Beck “Great Power and Great Responsibility” [2009] NZLJ 295 at 296. 
81 At 296. 
82 Grant Illingworth QC “The Judicial Conduct Commissioner” [2011] NZLJ 35 at 36. 
83 At 39. 
84 Sir David Gascoigne QC Annual Report for 2014 / 2015 (Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner, 
Wellington, 21 August 2015) at 5. 
85 Illingworth, n 82, at 35. 
86 Dr Matthew Palmer QC “Constitutional Realism” (2006) 54 America Journal of Comparative Law 587 at 
608.  
87 At 614. 
88 Panel Act, s 8(1). 
89 Panel Act, s 9. 
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removal or (b) whether there are grounds for dismissing the complaint.90 When the 
Commissioner has formed such an opinion he is required to take one of three steps:91 dismiss 
the complaint,92 refer it to the Head of Bench,93 or recommend the appointment of a Panel.94  
 
3. Attorney-General 
 
The Attorney-General may appoint a Panel to inquire into and report on any matter relating to 
the conduct of the judge.95 Section 22(1) of the Panel Act reads as follows: 
 
A Judicial Conduct Panel consists of the following persons appointed by the 
Attorney-General: 
(a) 2 members, being— 
(i) Judges; or 
(ii) a Judge and a retired Judge; or 
(iii) a member who is a Judge or a retired Judge, and a member who is 
a barrister or solicitor who has held a practising certificate as such 
for not less than 7 years; and 
(b) a lay member (not being a Judge, a retired Judge, or a barrister or 
solicitor). 
 
One of the functions of the Panel is that it “must conduct a hearing into the matter or matters 
referred to it by the Attorney-General.”96  
 
The Panel must report to the Attorney-General at the end of the inquiry.97 The report must 
contain the following: (a) the findings of fact, (b) the opinion as to whether removal is 
justified or not, and (c) the reasons for the conclusion.98  
 
                                                          
90 Panel Act, s 15(1). 
91 Panel Act, s 15(5). 
92 Panel Act, s 16. 
93 Panel Act, s 17. 
94 Panel Act, s 18. 
95 Panel Act, s 21(1). 
96 Panel Act, s 24(2). 
97 Panel Act, s 32(1). 
98 Panel Act, s 32(2). 
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4. Judicial Conduct Panel 
 
The closest that New Zealand has come to an inquiry is Wilson v Attorney-General.99 The 
plaintiff was a judge of the Supreme Court. In 2007, and when still a judge of the Court of 
Appeal, the plaintiff sat on an appeal involving Mr Galbraith QC, a close friend and business 
associate. Saxmere lost the case and unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court on the 
merits. Saxmere then launched an application to the Supreme Court based on the plaintiff’s 
alleged bias. This was unsuccessful. But Saxmere’s second application resulted in recall of 
the earlier judgment.100  
 
The High Court made various pronouncements on the nature of the Panel. First, the Panel is 
independent of the executive; the Chief Justice is consulted on its membership, which must 
include at least one judge.101 Second, the Panel inquiry may differ from the Attorney-
General’s referral in two respects, namely, (a) that Special Counsel brings independent 
judgment to bear on the matter and must act in the public interest and (b) the Panel may 
inquire into other matters regarding the judge during the course of its inquiry.102 Third, the 
Panel can be described as a “special tribunal”.103 Fourth, it is not for the Commissioner to 
have the final say regarding the applicable standard because he would not know the facts; the 
standard is to be set by the Panel and ultimately the House.104 Fifth, the assessment of 
culpability and the gravity of the judge’s non-disclosure really depends on where his conduct 
sits on a factual spectrum: at the one end is good faith and the other is misbehaviour 
warranting removal; the task of placing the judge’s conduct on the spectrum is one for the 
Panel and not the Commissioner.105      
 
The effect of the Commissioner’s limited fact finding powers comes to the fore in cases 
where a complaint gives rise to a material dispute of fact.106 In such cases the Commissioner 
will likely decide to recommend an inquiry by the Panel. The Wilson report was only 
                                                          
99 Wilson v Attorney-General [2011] 1 NZLR 399 (HC).  
100 At paras 1 – 3 and 10 – 17. 
101 At para 40. 
102 At para 48. 
103 At para 49. 
104 At para 64. 
105 At para 90. 
106 The Hon. Justice McGrath “Accountability of the Judiciary” (2014) 25 Public Law Review 134 at 144. 
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provisional but it led to the Justice’s resignation.107 A further concern is that judges faced 
with adverse provisional findings may view judicial review as the only meaningful way of 
challenging the report rather than an inquiry.108 
 
5. Tentative Conclusions 
 
While this paper has identified some concerns with the legal framework for judging judges in 
New Zealand, it is apparent that the judiciary does not suffer from the same levels of 
misconduct as in South Africa. This paper submits that the manner in which the judiciary is 
organised does not necessarily determine the level of performance and stability of the judicial 
system.  
 
This paper’s main point of comparison between South Africa and New Zealand bears 
repetition. While South Africa with its supreme Constitution has three ongoing Tribunals in 
respect of several judges, New Zealand with its parliamentary supremacy has no current 
Panels. This comparison presents two main lessons for New Zealand. The first concerns the 
different kinds of diversity in the composition of the Tribunal and Panel. As will be argued 
below, this difference is in some respects the product of the difference between constitutional 
supremacy and parliamentary supremacy. The second lesson concerns the attempt to answer 
the perplexing question whether misconduct is the result of the legal framework or non-
compliance with the legal framework. As will be argued below, the problem of judicial 
misconduct in South Africa is not rooted in its constitutional arrangements but rather in the 
lack of shared propriety in the legal profession in general and amongst legal practitioners in 
particular.  
 
C. Lessons for New Zealand 
 
1. The Two Faces of Diversity 
 
While South Africa and New Zealand both guarantee diversity in their respective Tribunals 
and Panels, the nature of this diversity is different. South Africa guarantees gender diversity 
by providing that at least one member of every Tribunal must be a woman. But all the 
members are legally qualified; they are either judicial officers or legal practitioners. In 
                                                          
107 At 144. 
108 At 144. 
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contrast, New Zealand does not require gender diversity but instead requires lay diversity. 
The Panel must consist of at least one layperson thereby representing the non-legal 
community in judicial misconduct matters.   
 
(a) Gender diversity on the Tribunal  
 
Diversity is a hallmark feature of the Constitution. The preamble states that South Africans 
are united in diversity. The Constitution guarantees various kinds of diversity such as 
linguistic diversity, political diversity, cultural diversity, race and gender diversity in judicial 
appointments, and, especially, diversity in legal decision-making.109 Regarding the last type 
of diversity mentioned, section 180(c) of the Constitution reads as follows: 
 
180. Other matters concerning administration of justice 
National legislation may provide for any matter concerning the administration 
of justice that is not dealt with in the Constitution, including - (c) the 
participation of people other than judicial officers in court decisions.     
 
Some brief historical context is required. Milton Seligson SC has argued that the 
reintroduction of lay assessors in the lower courts toward the end of apartheid was done in 
order “to involve the black majority in the all-white court system which was seen by many as 
illegitimate and unrepresentative.”110 But the experiment was not successful.111  
 
Further to the above, it is clear from section 180(c) that lay participation is confined to “court 
decisions”. But the Constitution also clearly distinguishes between courts, tribunals and other 
fora. Section 34 of the Bill of Rights reads as follows: 
 
34. Access to courts 
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. 
  
                                                          
109 Constitution, ss 6, 19, 31, 174(2), and 180(c) respectively. 
110 Milton Seligson SC “Lay participation in South Africa from apartheid to majority rule” (2001) 72 
International Review of Penal Law 273 at 273. 
111 At 273. 
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This paper argues that section 180(c) must be read with section 34. Lay participation is only 
allowed in court decisions and a “court” is different from a “tribunal”. This is more than just 
a terminological point. The Constitution has made the distinction and it cannot be ignored. 
And the Constitution provides that any law inconsistent with it is invalid.112 Therefore, it is 
submitted that the amended JSC Act could not have provided for lay membership on the 
Tribunal since it is not a court. In other words, there is no constitutional basis for lay 
participation. 
 
Yet the legislature was still bound by the broader constitutional requirement for diversity in 
the composition of the Tribunal. And there is good reason for it to have prioritised gender 
diversity over other forms of diversity. Recently, the Commission for Gender Equality, a 
constitutional institution, recommended the drafting of a law on gender transformation in the 
judiciary.113 This demonstrates the level of concern over the issue of gender representation in 
judicial matters; this concern existed prior to the amended JSC Act and has grown more and 
more pressing with each year that passes by. 
 
(b) Lay diversity on the Panel     
 
When the Judicial Matters Bill was being debated in the House, the concern was raised that 
the provision for a lay member of the Panel might lead to political interference in the 
judiciary.114 This may pose a threat to judicial independence. But as the High Court held in 
Wilson, supra, the Panel is independent of the executive; the Chief Justice is consulted on its 
membership. The reality is that the legislature had to make a choice as to which kind of 
diversity it would promote on the Panel; there can only be three members; judicial officers 
and legal practitioners make up the majority; there was an issue over the third member and, 
arguably, the legislature promoted the public legitimacy of the Panel by opting for lay 
representation. In addition, the use of non-lawyers in legal decision-making may increasingly 
be the way of the future. For example, the Chief Justice of Delaware recently said that it is 
possible that “de-lawyering” of problem-solving courts would be required.115  
 
                                                          
112 Constitution, s 2. 
113 Bongani Majola “CGE recommends law on gender transformation in judiciary - The Presidency” (press 
statement, The Presidency, Pretoria, South Africa, 22 September 2015). 
114 (2 September 2003) 611 NZPD 8308. 
115 Debra Cassens Weiss “'De-lawyering' of problem-solving courts suggested by Delaware chief justice” ABA 
Journal (online ed., America, 11 February 2013). 
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While there is no guarantee of gender diversity on the Panel, it may well be that the Attorney-
General would appoint at least one woman to the Panel in practice. Furthermore, it bears 
repeating that the closest New Zealand has come to a Panel is the Justice Wilson matter and 
that ended in the justice’s resignation. 
 
So it is at least arguable from the above that the different kinds of diversity in New Zealand 
and South Africa are in some respects the product of the difference between constitutional 
supremacy and parliamentary supremacy. The same is not necessarily the case in explaining 
the different levels of judicial misconduct between the two countries. 
 
2. Where is the Perimeter? Fencing Off Conduct from Law and Policy 
 
The central question regarding conduct inquiries is whether it is possible to ring fence 
conduct issues from other issues such as law and policy. Is misconduct the result of the legal 
framework or non-compliance with the legal framework? Despite South Africa’s respected 
Constitution there are still three ongoing Tribunals in respect of several judges. It is unclear 
how a better legal framework would prevent conduct such as the alleged improper 
influencing of justices pending reserved judgment. This type of conduct is more the result of 
non-compliance with the applicable framework.  
 
(a) Judicial culture in South Africa 
 
How do judges view themselves? While some view the judiciary as forming a “secular 
priesthood”, this does not entitle the judiciary to “pontificate” to others.116 This is particularly 
so in matters relating to misconduct. How can Judge Motata preside over a drunk driving case 
having been convicted of the same offence himself? There has also been criticism of this 
conception of the judiciary. One judge went so far as to renounce “the ridiculousness of the 
idea of a secular priesthood” whether consisting of “politicians, judges or bureaucrats”.117 
 
Recently, the Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke reaffirmed the apolitical nature of the judiciary. 
During the latest round of JSC interviews, Moseneke DCJ reminded the candidates that they 
                                                          
116 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009] ZASCA 1 (12 January 2009) para 19. 
117 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village 
(2011/30368) [2012] ZAGPJHC 230 (15 November 2012) para 109.  
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were legally required to resign membership of their political party if elevated to the bench.118 
Moseneke DCJ is reported to have put it to one of the candidates in the following terms: "Just 
for the record, it is unlawful for a judge to be a member of a political organisation".119 This 
contrasts starkly with the equivalent system in Switzerland. Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC recently 
introduced a student symposium on the judiciary as an institution and one of the articles 
compared Switzerland with New Zealand.120 In Switzerland, judges are not only required to 
be members of a political party but are also required to pay over part of their salary to the 
party.121 And yet Switzerland is successful and the judiciary performs well.122 Sir Palmer 
analysed the article as follows:  
 
So the learning must be that there is more than one way to organise the 
judiciary and it cannot be assumed that the New Zealand way is the only one 
that can be successful. Political culture develops slowly over time and the 
Swiss seem to be able to handle fairly easily issues that we may think would 
fatally impair the independence of the judiciary.  
 
This paper submits that it is unlikely that South Africa would easily handle political 
patronage of the judiciary and vice versa. As demonstrated further above, the organisation of 
the judiciary in South Africa is not the problem. Rather, the problem lies in non-compliance 
with the framework. What is the cause of this non-compliance?  
 
(b) Brief explanations for non-compliance 
 
Part of the explanation may be the difficulties experienced in transforming a country. This 
paper has already dealt with Professor Corder’s observation that the onset of the Constitution 
and the appointment of judges from diverse constituencies arguably “weakened” the sense of 
shared propriety amongst judges. The bonds of judicial peer pressure have been loosened. 
This is clear from the fact that Judge President Hlophe took his superiors, the Constitutional 
Court justices, to court in unprecedented litigation; he even went so far as to aver that Justices 
                                                          
118 Jenni Evans “Judges can't belong to political parties–Moseneke” News24 (online ed., South Africa, 7 October 
2015). 
119 Evans, supra. 
120 Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC “The Judiciary as an Institution” (2015) 46 VUWLR 1. 
121 At 7. 
122 At 7. 
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Nkabinde and Jafta had been pressurised into making the complaint and that there may have 
been a “political motive” to get rid of him.123  
 
There is a further historical point to be made about the difficulties in transforming the 
judiciary and the differing views on the legitimacy of that institution. This historical 
perspective is amply demonstrated by a case heard in 1995 and coincidentally presided over 
by Judge Hlophe. In S v Collier124 there was an appeal against the magistrate’s refusal to 
recuse himself from the trial of the appellant. The appellant contended that the magistrate had 
erred in refusing recusal so as to allow the appellant to be tried by a non-white magistrate 
representative of his community.125 Judge Hlophe held as follows:126 
 
[T]he mere fact that the presiding officer is white does not necessarily 
disqualify him from adjudicating upon a matter involving a non-white 
accused. The converse is equally true. Otherwise no black magistrate or judge 
could ever administer justice fairly and even-handedly in a matter involving a 
white accused. 
 
This paper relies on Collier in order to demonstrate that the judiciary was seen as an 
illegitimate institution by many in South Africa. And the differing views on the nature of the 
judiciary and its role in society may, in part, explain the lack of a unified response to the 
numerous instances of alleged gross misconduct on the bench. This, in turn, may explain the 
unaccountable conduct on the part of some judges as well as their pettifoggery in taking 
every conceivable legal point available to them. This paper submits that no amount of 
legislative clarity could have prevented Judge Motata from reversing his Jaguar into the 
boundary wall. But a unified and outspoken legal profession could have called on the judge to 
resign gracefully for the good of the judiciary. This is what Justice Wilson did in New 
Zealand without even being asked to do so.  
 
This paper argues that the explanation for the levels of judicial misconduct may lie in the role 
of the legal profession in holding the judiciary to account. Or failing to hold it to account. In 
                                                          
123 Freedom Under Law v Acting Chairperson: Judicial Service Commission and Others (52/2011) [2011] 
ZASCA 59 (31 March 2011) para 6. 
124 S v Collier 1995 (8) BCLR 975 (C). 
125 At 11. 
126 At 13. 
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August 2009 retired Constitutional Court judge Johann Kriegler offered some explanations 
for the Hlophe JP controversy during a public lecture regarding judicial independence and 
transformation.127 He argued that Hlophe JP was not the problem but was rather a 
“manifestation of the problem”.128 He then observed that transformation means different 
things to different people; the collective memory of oppression under Apartheid is still very 
much present in South Africa.129 But judicial independence was nonetheless “absolutely 
essential”.130 He then identified two external threats to judicial independence; the first 
emanated from the governing party, the second from the JSC.131 Regarding the JSC, Kriegler 
argued that while it looked like the “best solution” on paper, it was not the “ideal solution in 
practice”.132 He went so far as to say that the manner in which the JSC had exercised its 
“quasi-disciplinary” function had actually increased the threat to judicial independence.133 
But, crucially, he went even further and criticised the serious omissions of the legal 
profession in not speaking out about the Hlophe saga. Kriegler said as follows:  
 
What did the legal profession do in the Hlophe case? Did it insist that this man 
was unfit for public office? On the contrary, it ran a mile. It knew what the 
facts were. There is not a lawyer in the country who has studied the facts who 
doesn’t know as well as I do, and Judge Hlophe knows what the situation was 
with his secret payment of close to half a million rands. We know! The legal 
profession looked the other way. And they left me to stand there alone. And I 
hold it against the legal profession – not because they did me an injustice. I’m 
prepared, as you can see, to take the slings and arrows again because I believe 
it has to be said. But I think that it did the administration of justice and the 
independence of the judiciary and the cause of transformation harm, in not 
speaking out when it should have spoken out. Because everybody knows that 
the only reason John Hlophe was not prosecuted last time round was because 
of the colour of his skin. And the Bar did nothing! 
 
                                                          
127 Johann Kriegler, retired Constitutional Court justice “Can Judicial Independence Survive Transformation?” 
(Public Lecture, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 18 August 2009). Public lecture downloaded from 
<www.constitutionallyspeaking.co.za> accessed on 11/10/2015.  
128 Kriegler, n 127.  
129 Kriegler, n 127. 
130 Kriegler, n 127. 
131 Kriegler, n 127. 
132 Kriegler, n 127. 
133 Kriegler, n 127. 
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These are bold words. But they are justified. This paper agrees with Kriegler’s view that a 
substantial contributor to the tarnished reputation of the judiciary is the lack of a concerted 
response from the legal profession. It is submitted that one of the primary reasons for this is 
division within the legal profession.  
 
There is plenty of evidence supporting the above submission. Only last year, the profession 
was in crisis in KwaZulu-Natal; their law society shut down with the result that no new 
practitioners could be admitted and enrolled, nor could any existing practitioners be 
disciplined or struck from the roll.134 The law society had become “dysfunctional” due to “in-
fighting” amongst council members.135 One legal practitioner is reported to have commented 
as follows: “This is a disgrace – that qualified, admitted lawyers whose job is dispute 
resolution cannot resolve what is clearly a political fight. It’s not on. It’s childish.”136 The 
origin of the dispute appears to have been a proposal to fund a new lawyer’s association, 
namely, the South African Attorneys Association.137 One of the reasons for the view that the 
dispute was the result of a “political fight” may be the change in composition of the council 
during the 1990s. The council had expanded to 20 seats with the National Democratic 
Lawyers Association and the Black Lawyers Association together holding half of the seats 
and “traditional” members holding the remaining half.138 Before long the national umbrella 
body, the Law Society of South Africa, resolved that the “Council of the KwaZulu-Natal Law 
Society must immediately resume its statutory obligations to protect the public and to carry 
out the regulation of its members”.139 This paper submits that the crisis in KwaZulu-Natal 
evidences the kind of division that exists within the legal profession. It is further submitted 
that this division is the proximate cause of the legal profession’s silence on the issue of 
judicial misconduct. Simply put, if the profession is preoccupied with in-fighting then it is 
unlikely to hold the judges to account for their actions. 
 
This paper does not intend to exonerate the individual judges of their misconduct. They must 
be held to account for their actions. Instead, this paper proposes that the inaction of the legal 
                                                          
134 Kamini Padayachee and Tania Broughton “KZN law society in turmoil” IOL News (online ed., South Africa, 
9 July 2014). 
135 Padayachee and Broughton, n 134. 
136 Padayachee and Broughton, n 134. 
137 Padayachee and Broughton, n 134. 
138 Padayachee and Broughton, n 134. 
139 Max Boqwana and Ettienne Barnard “KZN Law Society must get its act together – Law Society of SA” 
(press statement, The Law Society of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa, 10 July 2014). 
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profession and, more specifically, of legal practitioners has greatly exacerbated the problem. 
This inaction is arguably the result of division with the profession. Had the judges in question 
felt direct and sustained peer pressure from legal practitioners appearing before them in court 
on a daily basis, then it is submitted that South Africa would not be facing the crisis of public 
confidence in the judiciary that it faces today.  
 
II. Conclusion 
 
This paper concerned the difficult task of judging judges. The central question in conduct 
inquiries is whether it is possible to separate conduct issues from law and policy issues. The 
paper compared South Africa’s Tribunal with New Zealand’s Panel.  
 
The first part dealt with South African law. This part set out its fundamental structure and 
discussed the role of the JSC regarding the Tribunal. The paper then critically evaluated the 
ongoing Tribunals. It was tentatively concluded that the legal profession should have 
responded to the erosion of judicial integrity from the outset. 
 
The second part dealt with New Zealand law. This part set out its fundamental structure and 
discussed the role of the Commissioner and the Attorney-General regarding the Panel. The 
paper then discussed the investigative role of the Panel. It was tentatively concluded that the 
manner in which the judiciary is organised does not necessarily determine the level of 
performance and stability of the judicial system. 
 
The third part drew lessons from the preceding parts. The first concerned diversity in 
Tribunal and Panel membership; South Africa has gender diversity and New Zealand has lay 
diversity. The second concerned fencing off conduct issues from law and policy issues. The 
paper concluded that judicial misconduct is more about non-compliance with the applicable 
framework than the framework itself. And it was also concluded that non-compliance in 
South Africa is at least partly caused by inaction on the part of the legal profession in holding 
judges to account.  
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